Similarly, our approach to counterinsurgency in Iraq did not transfer directly to Afghanistan later in that war. Consider, for example, how the 1991 Persian Gulf War informed our operational success early in Operation Iraqi Freedom, but was unhelpful in identifying and dealing with the problem of insurgency. Doing so will prevent them from assuming that experience in one conflict will necessarily translate into success in the next.įurthermore, maneuver leaders should consider how their experiences in both conflict and peacetime training relate to the broad range of future contingencies. However, leaders must place their experiences within the context of a broad understanding of war and warfare. Those who know the hazards, confusion and complexity of war firsthand are more likely to effectively visualize, describe and direct their units towards mission success. This experience is unquestionably beneficial as the Army prepares for future conflicts and these leaders assume responsibilities at the operational and strategic levels. Army's officer and NCO leaders have acquired considerable wartime experience since September 11th, 2001. Clausewitz identifies "danger, physical exertion, intelligence and friction as the elements that coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, and turn it into a medium that impedes activity." This general friction makes military forces less effective in combat and his prescription is experience.
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